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This book collects together a number of contributions 
by leading experts on time preferences and related 
topics. My own background is in axiomatic models for 
decision under uncertainty and time preference is a 
new and recent interest for me. This book gives a broad 
overview of the relevant issues, and some deep 
analyses. It was a perfect introduction into the topic 
for me. At several places the authors express enthusi- 
asm (front flap: ‘Many of our most urgent national 
problems , . .’, p. xxiii: ‘With ever greater insistence, 
American social scientists are being called upon to 
explain and offer remedies for a broad range of societal 
problems . . .’). 
Similar to the field of decision under uncertainty, 
that is in the stage of ‘No to expected utility’ without 
yet a very clear alternative, the field of time preference 
is in the stage of ‘No to constant discounting’. Several 
chapters d o  argue for an alternative, i.e. hyperbolic 
discounting (receiving $x after time T is worth U(x)/  
(k+  T)‘, where k and r are constants and U is a utility 
function). 
Let me now summarize the chapters of the book, 
drawing upon the excellent summary provided in the 
preface. In Chapter 1, Loewenstein provides a histor- 
ical survey of the topic. It describes discussions between 
Jevons (future consumption gives present utility) and 
Bohm-Bawerk (future consumption gives only present 
cognition of future utility), and many other topics. 
Studying the historical development of a subject is a 
good way for getting acquainted with it, and I greatly 
enjoyed this chapter. Chapter 2, by Jon Elster, 
discusses methods for self-binding and commitment 
in politics, thus illustrating the broad relevance of time 
preference. 
Chapter 3, by Ainslie and Haslam, argues strongly 
for hyperbolic discounting instead of constant dis- 
counting, with a discussion of ideas of Freud on 
page 59. Page 63 presents an evolutionary argument 
for low discounting, and pages 65 onwards provide 
some formalizations, elaborated in a loose and thus 
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accessible manner. Chapter 4, by Rachlin and Raineri, 
also argues for hyperbolic discounting and compares it 
to many similar subjective perceptions. (A nice com- 
parison of Chapters 3 and 4 is given on pp. xii-xiii.) 
Next, Chapter 5 presents an influential paper by 
Loewenstein and Prelec, published also in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 107 (1992), pp. 513-91 (the 
volume and pages were not yet known when the book 
was printed). They employ a most useful analogy 
between time preference and preference under uncer- 
tainty to develop a time-preference analogy of prospect 
theory. I did wonder, in their model 
if the time points can be arbitrarily close. Finally, I 
cannot resist mentioning here that the preference 
condition to reduce the general separable form 
Zu(x, , t l )  to the multiplicatively decomposed formula 
displayed above, is the ‘tradeoff consistency condition’ 
of Wakker and Tversky (1993). Chapter 6, by Mischel, 
Shoda and Rodriguez, provides results on time 
preferences for young children. An amusing discovery 
is that children at  the age of 4, when trying to delay 
consumption, will expose the reward, making it only 
harder to  resist the temptation. One year later, children 
understand that exposing the reward is unwise 
(pp. 159/160). 
Chapter 7 presents Schelling’s ideas on self- 
command (‘A New Discipline’; note the pun!), con- 
sidering it a bargaining game between several ‘selves’. 
One of the many suggestions is that for self-command, 
clear unambiguous rules are good (‘smoke nothing’ is 
better than ‘don’t smoke too much’). In Chapter 8, 
Ainslie and Haslam write on the same topic, describing 
ways for self-control (‘personal rules’). 
Chapter 9, by Elster and Loewenstein, addresses the 
meta-level effect of utility from memory and antici- 
pation. A discussion is given of the anticipation of 
experiences (p. 231). It could be interesting here to see 
how anticipation of pain and worry can induce us to 
improve our actions. Chapter 10 presents Herrnstein 
and Prelec’s theory on ‘melioration’. It means that a 
person decides between alternative consumptions on 
the basis of the average past utilities of those 
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consumptions. That seems a rational procedure if no 
other information is available on the utility to be 
expected from consumption. An experiment is pre- 
sented where subjects are led to choose the most 
inferior consumption alternative, in accordance with 
melioration but contrary to rationality. It would be 
interesting to reconsider this experiment from the 
perspective that the subjects in it are facing decisions 
under uncertainty. In Chapter 11, Frank points out 
that a commitment for self-control can best be based on 
emotions, because the commitment should be as direct 
as the temptation to violate self-control. A discussion 
of nonconstant discounting is given. 
It is much easier to obtain empirical violations of a 
principle (independence, a linear relation, expected 
utility, constant discounting, etc.), than to prove a 
principle convincingly. Shefrin and Thaler write nicely 
on this in Chapter 12: ‘We are aware, of course, that 
criticizing the realism of the assumptions of an 
economic theory is hardly novel’ (p. 288). On the 
bottom of page 322 the empirical status of economic 
theory is described well: ‘It is typical of the general 
approach in microeconomics, which is to use a 
normative-based maximizing model for descriptive 
purposes’. Similar discussions on empirical meaning- 
fulness are found on page 324. Many economic 
phenomena (such as the IRA savings system) are 
explained by mental accounting, and policy implica- 
tions of the theory are presented. In Chapter 13, by 
Herrnstein and Prelec, many disciplines are mentioned 
that speak to addiction, and different interpretations 
(divided self, rational self-medication, etc.) are given 
for addiction. A remarkable identity on page 352, ‘love 
(i.e. sex)’, caught my eye. 
In Chapter 14, Becker, Grossman and Murphy 
summarize Becker and Murphy’s model of rational 
addiction, and the evidence supporting it, such as 
decreasing death rates for certain diseases resulting 
from increased taxes for alcohol or tobacco. The final 
chapter, 15, by Frank, describes the effects of frames of 
reference and the intertemporal wage profile. Let me 
end the summary with a nice description of utility 
functions: ‘. . . The utility function’s evolutionary role is 
to reward people with good feelings when they make 
progress toward survival and reproduction’ (p. 373). 
I list the few inaccuracies that I noted after a rather 
extensive study of the book, mainly to show how minor 
they are. I only found a moderate number of misprints. 
The reference systems in the different chapters are not 
uniform. It is not easy to find out which chapters have 
appeared as papers in journals. Several papers, by 
different authors, refer to Strotz (1955) whereas the 
correct reference is Strotz (1956). I did not discover 
which authors wrote the preface, but guess the editors 
themselves were the authors. Given that I read the 
book quite thoroughly, I think this short list of details 
is not extensive and I think that the book is a carefully 
prepared document. 
I end with a few general comments. It would be 
interesting to see if the strong discounting at time 
point 0 can be explained by (mental) transaction 
costs, and how much can be explained by response 
mode effects such as ‘scale compatibility’ (Tversky, 
Sattath and Slovic, 1988). A recent reference is Bohm 
Many chapters describe nonconstant discounting as 
a violation of stationarity, and put this on a same 
footing as what is known in the decision field as a 
violation of dynamic consistency (meaning one sticks 
to one’s prior decisions). There have been many 
discussions of this condition and related topics (‘con- 
sequentialism’) in the decision field (Hammond, 1988; 
Machina, 1989; McClennen, 1990). Relating these 
works to the time preference field would be most 
interesting. Thus the discussion by Ainslie and Haslam 
on pages 74-75 of violations of stationarity seems to be 
based on the assumption of consequentialism (optimize 
the future independently of foregone possibilities in the 
past), and their discussion on page 179 reminded me of 
McClennen’s (1989) ideas of inner-mental commitment 
without extraneous reinforcements. 
I hope this review shows that, for me, the book was a 
rich source of ideas, and it was a joy reading it. The 
quality of the contributions is high which, given the 
outstanding reputations of the contributors, this is no 
surprise. 
Peter Wakker, Medical Decision Making Unit, Univer- 
sity of Leiden, PO Box 9600, K-6-R, 2300 RC Leiden, 
The Netherlands 
(1994). 
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